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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues for a renewed consideration of counterfactuals within geography.  
Drawing upon Doreen Massey’s emphasis on notions of ‘possibility’, ‘chance’, 
‘undecidability’ and ‘happenstance’, we argue for an engagement with approaches in 
the humanities that have addressed such issues directly.  We review previous uses of 
counterfactual method in historical geography, particularly as related to cliometrics 
and the ‘new economic history’ of the 1960s, but argue that a recent upsurge of 
interest in other disciplines indicates alternative ways that ‘what-if’ experiments 
might work in the sub-discipline.  Recent counterfactual work outside of geography 
has had a notably spatial cast, often thinking through the nature of alternative worlds, 
or using counterfactual strategies that are explicitly concerned with space as well as 
temporal causality.  We set out possible agendas for counterfactual work in historical 
geography.  These include: consideration of the historical geographies within existing 
counterfactual writings and analyses; suggestions for distinctive ways that historical 
geographers might think and write counterfactually, including experiments in 
geographies of happenstance, and the exploration of more-than-human possibilities; 
analyses of the geography of and in counterfactual writing; and study of the political, 
ethical and emotional demands that counterfactuals make.  This discussion and 
framework provides an extended introduction to this special edition of the Journal of 
Historical Geography on counterfactual geographies. 
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RUMINATION ON HEMISPHERES COLLIDING 
 
The armies were approaching the city from the quarter named the reed or 
crocodile – the direction in which the sun rises.  Much was known about 
them already.  Tales had come back from outlying provinces.  Tax 
gatherers from the city, collecting tribute from conquered territories, had 
met up with them.  Envoys had been despatched, to engage in talks, to find 
out more.  And now neighbouring groups, chafing against their long 
subordination to the Aztec city, had thrown their lot with the strange 
invaders.  Through these prior contacts, the constant flow of messages, 
rumours, interpretations reaching the city, much was known of the 
approaching army.  Although the strangers’ bodies were completely 
covered, were ‘white, as if made of lime’ and had ‘yellow hair’ (although 
some had black), their ways of warfare seemed familiar.  Like the Aztecs, 
they rode and fought on horseback.  The strangers were approaching 
Tenochtitlán, the biggest city in the world.  Its empire now stretched far, 
through conquest and continual violent subordination.  Thus far the Aztecs 
had conquered all before them and these strangers were not the first to 
challenge their authority.  And as before, Moctezuma’s mounted warriors 
would be victorious and drive the invaders into the sea.  This would be yet 
another glorious moment for the Empire.1 
 
So Doreen Massey might have written at the beginning of For space.  Massey views 
the encounter between the Aztecs and the Spanish as the ‘meeting-up of two stories, 
each already with its own spaces and geographies, two imperial histories’.2  Our 
4 
 
opening imagines a slightly different meeting-up.  In his Guns, germs and steel, Jared 
Diamond treats the Spanish-Aztec encounter in not dissimilar terms, as an instance of 
‘hemispheres colliding’, when ‘Native American’ and ‘Eurasian’ societies came 
violently together.  In ruminating on this encounter, Massey’s aim is to encourage us 
to rethink space ‘as the sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist’, rather than a 
static surface across which some (the Spanish) move whilst others (the Aztecs) remain 
immobile.3  For Diamond it offers different insights, specifically about why 
Europeans were about to reach and conquer the lands of ‘Native Americans’ and not 
vice versa.  To account for this, he identifies differences between the societies in 1492 
CE.  One of the most glaring, Diamond contends, was the relative absence of large 
domesticated mammal species in the Americas, ‘due largely to the Late Pleistocene 
extinction (extermination?) of most of North and South America’s former big wild 
mammal species’.  Such species provided Eurasian societies with protein, power and 
transport.4  To emphasise the difference this made in the collision of hemispheres, 
Diamond undertakes a counterfactual thought experiment: 
 
If it had not been for those extinctions, modern history might have taken a 
different course.  When Cortés and his bedraggled adventurers landed on 
the Mexican coast in 1519, they might have been driven into the sea by 
thousands of Aztec cavalry mounted on domesticated Native American 
horses.  Instead of the Aztecs dying of smallpox, the Spaniards might have 
been wiped out by American germs transmitted by disease-resistant 
Aztecs.  American civilizations resting on animal power might have been 
sending their own conquistadores to ravage Europe.  But those 
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hypothetical outcomes were foreclosed by mammal extinctions thousands 
of years earlier.5 
 
Diamond’s counterfactual takes us back to what Massey could have written in a world 
that might have been.  Despite clear theoretical and political differences between their 
work,6 it is appropriate that we start this special edition with an alternative to the 
opening rumination of For Space on the multiplicity of trajectories that converged at 
the place and time when Hernán Cortés and his small Spanish army arrived at 
Tenochtitlán.  Indeed, such a rewriting is even invited by Massey’s proposition that 
space should be understood ‘as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of 
multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality’; her emphasis on notions of 
‘possibility’, ‘chance’, ‘undecidability’ and ‘happenstance;’7 and her insistence on 
rethinking assumptions about the fixity of the physical and natural worlds.8  In this 
light, we follow Diamond in imagining a different collision with both the Spanish and 
the far more numerous Aztecs having domesticated horses at their disposal.  The 
result of this meeting-up would surely have been different.  Diamond does not explain 
exactly how this conjectural Aztec imperial history, with its equine spaces and horse 
geographies, might have come about, but his overall argument turns on the orientation 
of continental axes.  He argues that the east-west orientation of Eurasia’s axis 
facilitated the diffusion of domesticated plant and animal species, whereas the north-
south orientation of the Americas did not.9  Perhaps if the tectonic plates had drifted 
differently and the Americas had been orientated more east-west, then the continent’s 
more widely distributed large mammal species would not have become extinct and 
Moctezuma would have had his cavalry.  
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This is counterfactual experiment on a grand scale and deliberately provocative.  We 
certainly claim no expertise in the unpredictability of plate tectonic movement, nor 
can we plausibly insist that an alternative Moctezuma would have ridden out to 
slaughter a different Cortés in this alternative world.  And yet the thought-experiment 
does change the way we think about this meeting-up, making active the very 
fundamentals of physical geography and biogeography that are the most static and 
taken-for-granted contexts for most analyses of such events.  It develops Massey’s 
reading of  ‘migrant rocks’ in For space; it was not simply that the movements of 
tectonic plates created ‘an Atlantic for Hernán Cortés to cross’, but that the specific 
movements of rocks conditioned and constrained future human actions.10  None of the 
papers that follow are quite so dramatic in their use of counterfactual thinking, but all 
explore its potential for opening new ways of thinking and new ways of writing in 
historical geography.  As well as introducing those papers, this extended opening 
article develops Massey’s ideas about space and chanciness, and analyses their 
relationship with counterfactual thought.  We review earlier engagements with 
counterfactuals in geography, and discuss important examples of work in other 
disciplines that has direct relevance for historical geography.  We also make 
suggestions about a range of different uses and responses to counterfactual work in 
historical geography. 
 
THE CHANCE OF SPACE 
 
In For Space, Massey turns to a number of inspirations in thinking about what she 
describes as the ‘chance of space’, how ‘in spatial configurations, otherwise 
unconnected narratives may be brought into contact, or previously unconnected ones 
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be wrenched apart’.11  She draws upon two approaches to chance that she argues are 
directly relevant to geographical understanding: firstly the postmodernist perspectives 
of Lyotard and Derrida, particularly as explicitly spatialised and materialised in the 
work of the architect, Bernard Tshumi; and secondly, in the ways that a scientific 
literature on chaos theory, complexity and uncertainty has been used to ‘licence a 
celebration of undecidability in social matters’.12  While sympathetic to Massey’s 
broader claims about the connections between possibility and geography, we argue 
here that an alternative approach, one embedded in the perspectives of the humanities, 
has significant potential for geographical understanding.  While controversial, 
counterfactualism is an approach to provisionality and transitoriness that has the 
potential to provoke discussion of specific cause and effect relations and 
contingencies in ways that are unamenable to the generalised ontological claims for 
uncertainty made by much post-structural thought.   
 
Counterfactualism also shares some characteristics with complexity theory, 
particularly as based upon computer simulation models.13  Indeed, in a typology of 
forms of counterfactual experiment, the political scientists Philip Tetlock and Aaron 
Belkin, explicitly recognise the ‘epistemological kinship’ of these approaches.14  
Nonetheless, there is a strong tendency towards reductionism where complexity is 
applied to the social world, particularly in the search for emergent properties.  Such 
approaches, even those that adopt sophisticated ‘multi-agent social simulation’ (where 
there is differentiation between the modelled characteristics applied to individuals or 
groups) risk reducing human beings to reactive objects, devoid of agency, emotions, 
intent and reflection.15  By contrast, in many of the most common forms of 
counterfactual experiment, it is precisely the chancy nature of such characteristics that 
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are at the crux of speculation, with actions and decisions then placed within a longer 
narrative of consequence and response that draws necessarily upon interpretative as 
well as explanatory knowledge of human behaviour and social organization.16 
 
Counterfactuals have hardly made an appearance in the history of historical 
geography.  The one sustained argument for their use by William Norton, particularly 
in his Historical Analysis in Geography, came as a late echo of spatial science.  
Norton argued that a key approach for historical geography involved ‘explicit cause-
and-effect analyses relating process and form and possibly incorporating simulations 
and counterfactuals’.17  Norton’s inspiration and model was the so-called ‘new 
economic history’ of the late 1950s and 1960s, particularly Robert Fogel’s pioneering 
work on the significance of railway technology for American economic growth, and 
his later controversial assessment of the economic effects of slavery.18 The new 
economic history was based upon quantitative modelling of economies, usually using 
neo-classical price theory, ‘tested’ against reality through a series of simulated runs.  
Once the models were calibrated, they could be used to judge the significance of 
particular factors in counterfactual experiments.  So in Fogel’s work the significance 
of the development of the railways is tested by running a pre-calibrated simulation 
model of the American economy with the counterfactual assumption that the railways 
did not exist.   
 
For Norton, the counterfactual technique was ‘perhaps the most original and 
distinctive component of the new economic history’ and an approach that demanded 
more attention by historical geographers.  Interestingly the examples that he provides 
follow less the form of tightly defined econometric models, than looser thought 
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experiments, for example, about the consequences for Canadian history of an early 
discovery of the Hudson river by Champlain on any of his voyages south from Port 
Royal in 1604, 1605 and 1606 (Norton sketches a long narrative of consequence 
leading to a potentially ‘indestructible’ French North American empire.)  These kinds 
of speculations, which have more in common with recent work by political scientists 
on the geopolitical consequences of plausible changes in exploration and military 
campaigns, were buried in a book whose main message was seen as a defence of 
heavily-criticised positivistic epistemologies.19  By 1984 the tide had long since 
turned against such approaches in the sub-discipline, and disappointingly 
counterfactuals, if considered at all by geographers, were seen as part and parcel of 
econometric analysis.  A short entry by Derek Gregory in early editions of the 
Dictionary of Human Geography explicitly connected counterfactual methods to 
econometric history and formal model building, but suggested, quoting Postan, that 
‘the might-have-beens of history are not a profitable subject for discussion.’20 
 
If counterfactual methods and experiments have been pretty marginal in debates over 
methods and epistemologies for historical geography, they have a long and 
controversial status in the discipline of history.  For some historians, perhaps the 
majority, counterfactualism catches in the craw.  It is almost obligatory in discussing 
counterfactual approaches to reference E. P. Thompson’s castigation of counterfactual 
history as ‘Geschichtswissenschlopff’ (unhistorical shit), or E. H. Carr’s rather more 
polite dismissal of ‘parlour-games’ in What is History?21  The ferocity of the sceptical 
reaction is striking; others have described the approach as a dead end or a 
‘methodological rathole’.22  
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Such criticisms come from a wide range of positions.  For Carr, this came from a 
commitment to history as the factual record of the past, an epistemology most fully 
expressed in the work of Michael Oakeshott who claimed that the question ‘is never 
what must, or what might have taken place, but solely what the evidence obliges us to 
conclude did take place’.23  On the part of many historians there is an almost visceral 
hatred of work that plays with the past, castigated as alchemical pretend-histories and 
‘unabashed wastes of time by historians who ought to know better.’24  In historians 
committed to a strong idea of the truth of the past, the shift from evidence to 
speculation, and a concentration on overtly fictional counterfactual scenarios is a 
denial of history, not an extension to its methods.  Other critics point to the 
impossibility of verification of counterfactual speculation; in a sense the only thing 
we can be certain of is that, by definition, they did not take place.  Even those more 
sympathetic to counterfactualism worry about the difficulties of establishing clear 
rules to distinguish between plausible alternatives and wild flights of fantasy.  A 
radically different denial of experiments in the possible past follows the tradition of 
philosophical holism in Liebniz, and then the teleological historicisms of Hegel and 
Marx.  Here the objection to histories of what might have been and of possible worlds 
concerns not the facticity of the past, but its necessity.  For such ontologies there is a 
necessary relation of events and specific spatial configurations to an essential social 
whole or determined path of historical change.25  
 
It is fair to suggest that most contemporary practicing historical geographers hold 
epistemological positions that are rather different from these.  This in and of itself is 
not a justification for advocating counterfactual experiment as a new methodology for 
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historical geographers, but it does suggest that there might be scope at the very least 
for an exploration of its possibilities.  This sense is strengthened by three relatively 
recent developments.   
 
First, there have been a number of sustained arguments advocating forms of 
counterfactual method.  At the most fundamental (as discussed in this special edition 
by Mark Day) this is an argument that all forms of causal explanation of what 
happened necessarily involve consideration of what did not happen and what might 
have happened.  Any claims that event or factor x made a critical causal contribution 
to the outcome y, necessarily imply an imagined situation where y did not occur 
because x was absent.  This ubiquitous but usually unacknowledged ‘what-if’ 
reasoning is implied by many of the words that are used to construct our analyses and 
narratives; words and phrases like ‘influenced’, ‘shaped’, ‘impacted upon’, 
‘facilitated’, ‘brought about’, ‘precipitated’ all allude to causality, and all imply that 
things could have been different.26  Although most contemporary historical 
geographers are reticent to frame their narratives and analyses as explicit exercises in 
cause-and-effect, this is both a powerful reminder of the ubiquity of causal claims in 
our work, and a reminder of the way that even the most prosaic and mild assertions in 
our work are haunted by the possibilities of what might have been. 
 
Beyond this general claim of the inevitability of counterfactuals are more focused 
calls for specific forms of counterfactual method.  Perhaps the best-known of these is 
Niall Ferguson’s introductory essay to the edited collection Virtual History.27  
Ferguson’s discussion focuses on a common form of counterfactual thought, the 
switching of key events or a change in a decision: what would have followed if Home 
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Rule for Ireland had been enacted in 1912, if Germany had invaded southern England 
in 1940, if Kennedy had not been shot.  His fundamental aim is to use counterfactual 
experiment to demonstrate the indeterminacy of history and the intrinsic failings of 
historical sociology and deterministic theories of history, particularly Marxism.28  Yet 
there is no logical reason why such what-if scenarios should necessarily indicate 
either the radical unpredictability of history, or the primacy of the decisions of ‘great 
men’.  Such thought experiments may also be used to explore the robustness of 
historical formations, or perhaps tellingly to help tease out the relative significance of 
individual agency, chance and wider structures.  The use of counterfactuals as a tool 
for historical social and political science (rather than in a polemic rejection of such 
approaches) is to be found in Geoffrey Hawthorn’s influential Plausible Worlds and 
in the work of the political scientist Philip Tetlock.29  Despite their ideological 
differences, the works of Ferguson, Hawthorn and Tetlock all attempt to move beyond 
claims about the logical inevitability of counterfactual reasoning, towards formulating 
rules of engagement for the formulation of counterfactual experiments and narratives, 
that have implications for their possible use by historical geographers. 
 
Secondly and pertinently for historical geography, one of the features of this renewed 
academic interest in counterfactual strategies has been a developing sense of 
explorations of alternative worlds.30  In the classic switching-event form of 
counterfactual there is a sense of consequences spreading out in a kind of time-space 
cone from the imagined change – a different world results because the Greeks lost to 
the Persians at Salamis, because the Chinese Admiral Zheng He was not stopped from 
continuing his explorations of South Asia and Africa in the early fifteenth century, 
because Henry VIII of England chose not to break with Rome, or because Stalin died 
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before the Germans were repulsed from the Soviet Union.  In these examples, 
geography seems secondary, a consequence of a different unfolding of events.  
However, other forms of counterfactual thinking bring a much more active sense of 
the interconnections between space and time.  An important example is the collection 
of essays on Unmaking the West that has as its central focus not a chain of events, but 
a fundamental geographical world ordering.  While most of the essays in Unmaking 
the West follow a conventional form of counterfactual experiment, usually following 
the ‘minimal rewrite rule’ (i.e.  making suggestions that require only small and 
immediately plausible changes to the actual historical record, such as a change in the 
outcome of a battle or a political decision, or the early death of a key agent), their 
combined and cumulative effect is a form of grand-scale path dependency analysis.  
This leads to a broad conclusion that prior to about 1500 CE it was relatively easy to 
‘throttle the baby in its cradle’ but that ‘by the eighteenth century, in order to derail 
Western expansion one needs to advance increasingly complex what-if scenarios that 
tinker with history at multiple junctures and stretch the credulity and patience of even 
indulgent readers’.31  
 
A rather different kind of exploration of alternative worlds is to be found in 
Hawthorn’s Plausible Worlds.  Here the relationship between time and space, or 
between event and geography becomes more complex, demonstrating sensibilities that 
might be described as those of historical geography as much as of historical 
sociology.  One of Hawthorn’s counterfactual examples focuses on the plague 
pandemics in early modern Europe, questioning whether they must be regarded as 
immutable natural forces – to use Braudelian terms, part of the constraining biological 
regime in the longue durée of early modern Europe.  Two features of this analysis 
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stand out.  First, Hawthorn’s discussion opens out speculation about historical 
possibility away from battles and politics, and into the complex and hybrid 
interactions between microbes, animals, and human society.  Although the 
terminology and mode of argument used is rather different from that of actor network 
theory, Hawthorn is similarly straining conventional notions of human agency; this is 
counterfactual work in a more-than-human world.  Secondly, the organisation of 
space is central to Hawthorn’s counterfactual thinking.  In asking whether the 
incidence and spread of plague could have been limited earlier, Hawthorn gives 
priority to population structures and urban forms, to flows of people, goods, rats, fleas 
and bacilli and control of their movements, and particularly to urban governance.  The 
basic counterfactual argues that although it is implausible to imagine that early 
modern European thinking could develop a fully detailed aetiology and epidemiology 
of the plague and hence a ‘modern’ response to the disease, that nonetheless, it is 
plausible to posit a world in which authoritarian urban governments were able to 
effect successful cordons saintaires and thus greatly limit the spread of plague.  
Hawthorn argues that this is plausible because there were specific and limited 
contemporary examples of such policies in action.  Hawthorn’s counterfactual 
imagines not a single, switching event, but what is effectively a plausible alternative 
urban and political geography, not so very different from that which did exist.  
Hawthorn’s argument is that such experiment facilitates a middle course of historical 
analysis, one that moves beyond a simple dichotomy of determinism or chance, to see 
why what happened ‘turns not only on states of affairs that were beyond human 
control but also on an assessment of practical reasoning and public powers’.32  
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The final recent impetus towards an engagement with counterfactual thinking by 
historical geographers is the more general expansion of interest in these issues, in the 
academy and beyond.  There is, to put things bluntly, a lot of it about.  This is not to 
suggest that historical geographers should simply jump on a passing intellectual 
fashion.  However, what is clear is that counterfactual methods and the counterfactual 
imagination are being drawn upon in contexts that touch upon the concerns and 
interests of historical geographers.  These include the history of science,33 global 
history,34 geopolitics and international relations,35 as well as renewed debates about 
agency and structure.36  A growing fascination for exploring what-if questions and for 
thinking about alternative worlds is even more apparent in fictional writing, where it 
goes under such names as  ‘alternate history’, ‘alternate universes’, ‘allohistory’, 
‘uchronia’ and ‘parahistory’.37  Recent speculative fiction ranges from the popular 
writing of Harry Turtledove,38 to more self-consciously ‘high concept’ novels by 
William Gibson, Bruce Sterling and Neal Stephenson.39  This work indicates the 
popularity of counterfactual writing, but also demonstrates the great range of ways in 
which what-if questions are asked and answered. 
 
COUNTERFACTUAL AGENDAS 
 
The papers in this special edition come from an ongoing discussion about the use and 
potential of counterfactuals for historical geography, particularly in a session at the 
Royal Geographical Society with Institute of British Geographers conference in 
London in 2006, and a follow-up workshop organised by the Social and Cultural 
Research Group at Royal Holloway, University of London in 2007.40  Those 
discussions identified more general questions and issues concerning counterfactuals 
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and historical geography, that both provide themes for this issue and possible agendas 
for future research and reflection.  In this section. we address some of these key 
questions.  
  
What are the Explicit and Implicit Historical Geographies in Existing Counterfactual 
Writings and Analyses?  
 
The concern here is to make clear the significance of the spatial in counterfactual 
work, or to put it another way, to address the ‘where’ in what-if questions.  As has 
already been suggested above, there is a category distinction that can be made 
between the ‘minimal rewrite’, switching event, style of counterfactual analysis with 
its spatio-temporal cone of consequences, and those counterfactuals that imagine 
different worlds or spatial assemblages.  These two forms are not necessarily 
exclusive; in fictional counterfactual writing particularly, a switching event may be 
used to explain the emergence of an alternative world.  There are nonetheless 
important distinctions between counterfactual work that starts with events, and that 
which concentrates on alternative worlds, not just in their analytical, rhetorical and 
emotional potential, but also in their approach to spatiality.41   
 
Within these broad types, we are able to indicate ways in which the geographical is 
underplayed or unacknowledged in the construction of possibilities and alternatives.  
For example, the metaphor of the ‘path not taken’ is common in counterfactual 
speculation, but also indicates the potential interplay of temporalities and spatialities.  
A whole sub-set of counterfactual possibilities are bound up with the geographies of 
movement (literally of the paths not taken), and of presence and co-presence.  To 
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borrow from Massey, if we shift from a sense of space as passive container and 
consequence of events in time, to a sense of space as contemporaneous plurality and 
co-existing trajectories, then we move towards discussions not so much of chance 
events, as chancy choreographiesand the nature of ‘throwntogetherness’.42 
 
How Might Historical Geographers Think, Work and Write Counterfactually in 
Distinctive Ways? 
 
Such a concern for chance in spaces of flows is one way that historical geographers 
might bring a distinctive approach to counterfactual work.  This picks up on a long 
running concern within geography about ways of representing contemporaneous 
actions and agents separated in space, but actually or potentially connected by 
different kinds of flow and by the eventual consequences of actions.43  The 
conventional counterfactual form is seductive in its simplicity, and powerfully 
engaging in its narrative form – once this single decision or event is changed, then this 
would most likely follow, then this, then this, and so on.44  The narrative coherence of 
this form reinforces a particular politics of history; for the likes of Ferguson or 
Andrew Roberts this is not merely verification of the indetermincy of history, but also 
of the potentially decisive power of key agents.  While necessarily recognising 
inequalities of power, a counterfactualism that worked through multiple trajectories 
and possibilities – a geography of happenstance, rather than a singular point of chance 
– could indicate the limits of the significance of ‘great men’ (or indeed provide 
stronger affirmation of the relative powerlessness of some agents).  Such a multiple 
and dispersed counterfactualism does of course rapidly become an impossibility as the 
number of elements increases.  However even a more simple exercise focused on two 
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or three spatially-separated switching events has potential in exploring the 
overlapping patterns of consequences.  An alternative form of geographical 
counterfactualism might emphasise the significance of crossing trajectories and co-
presence in history, by considering meetings that might or might not have happened.   
 
The initial example from Diamond indicates an extreme form of another way that 
historical geographers might pose distinctive counterfactual questions, by opening the 
more-than-human world to thoughts about chance and possibility.  In considering why 
space matters, one potential strategy is to think through the possible consequences of 
changing space.  In Diamond’s example this does not result from a switching event 
and diverging pathways (perhaps located in the geo-physics of the break-up of 
Pangea), nor is there even a general assertion that this is a plausible alternative world.  
This is a pure example of a counterfactual thought experiment, but one that for all its 
implausibility, makes a powerful case about the implications of the actual continental 
alignments for the development of ecologies and civilizations.  Yet our use of 
counterfactual thinking in relation to the natural world is not necessarily restricted to 
such abstract experiments.  Hawthorn’s work on plague and fertility regimes is both 
an indication of the potential value of counterfactual method in these ‘hybrid 
geographies’ and a warning against a Braudelian disposition to treat the natural world 
as external, slow-moving, and in a sense outside of the chanciness of human societies.   
 
This sense of the chanciness of the nature is present in some conventional 
counterfactual history.  For example, the capricious weather of the English Channel 
has been a particularly fruitful source of intuitively plausible switching events:  what 
if the seas had been calm in 1588, or the ‘Protestant wind’ had not carried William of 
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Orange safely to Torbay a hundred years later?45  Disease, particularly as a cause of 
sudden death of ‘great men’ also plays a regular part in counterfactual speculation.  
However, we should be prepared to go beyond such specific examples of the 
chanciness of the ‘natural’ world.  Recent work in the physical sciences, notably in 
the study of rapid climate change, indicates the unfixity and unpredictability of 
natural systems; related work also indicates the unforeseen and lasting ‘natural’ 
consequences of human actions.  The asking of environmental what-if questions can 
be a powerful tool in revealing the limits of conventional assumptions about the 
stability and resilience of different social and political formations.      
 
What are the Historical Geographies of Counterfactual Analyses and Writing?  
 
There are very many examples of counterfactual analyses and of counterfactual 
writing.  This is also an extensive literature within philosophy and historiography on 
the nature of counterfactual method.  What are conspicuously absent are cultural and 
geographical studies of the context of counterfactual thought, or what might be 
described as historical geographies of counterfactualism itself.  Two inter-related 
issues would be central to such work.  First, a historical geography of 
counterfactualism would be concerned to identify the kinds of societies where 
counterfactual thought has flourished, been repressed, or simply not considered a 
possibility.  Within the limited context of academic and intellectual cultures it is 
possible to make some initial suggestions.  Tetlock and Parker suggest, in passing, 
that ‘the debate for and against counterfactual history has engaged British and 
American historians notably more than historians from other countries’.46 Whether 
this observation can be generalised to wider intellectual cultures is hard to judge; it 
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might be suggested that resistance to certain kinds of meta-narratives in Anglo-
American intellectual worlds facilitates a history of possibility, and also that the 
strength of the analytical philosophy of causality in the Anglophone world invites 
historical speculation about alternative chains of events in ways that more holistic 
‘continental’ philosophies do not.  Certainly, one might expect deterministic theories 
of history, most obviously historical materialism, to leave limited scope for 
speculation about possible paths, though even in the case of Marxism there are 
marked cultural differences in the significance granted to the paths not taken, as 
famously demonstrated by E. P. Thompson’s attacks on the closure of Althusserian 
Marxism.47  Counterfactual speculation, with its emphasis on contingent causalities 
might also be allergic to stronger varieties of postmodernism; where claims are made 
for ‘a depthless horizontality of immediate connections’ the exploration of possible 
trajectories and consequences is shut down.48 
 
Turning from intellectual life to wider popular cultures indicates even more strongly 
the absence of systematic work on the historical geography of counterfactual thought.  
Do times of political, military or financial crisis encourage speculation not just about 
possible futures, but also about alternative pasts and presents?  Do repressive regimes 
effectively shut down the desire to imagine alternatives, or is this a particular form of 
cultural resistance?  Is counterfactual thinking a bourgeosie indulgence giving the 
frisson of insecurity and adventure to the secure and stable, or is its wider appeal 
rooted in a desire to show how easily things might have been different?49  There is 
some work on the social and cultural context, particularly concerning gender 
differences, in work on the psychology of counterfactual thinking, which explores 
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regret and ‘if-only’ patterns of thought.50  What there is not is wider study of the 
contexts of popular counterfactual culture. 
 
Related to this is a paucity of study of the subject and content of counterfactual 
speculation (and again particularly of specific cultural and historical context of the 
salience and popularity of certain counterfactuals.)  Karen Hellekson’s study of the 
genre of the alternate history traces the development of a specific genre of 
counterfactual writing, beginning with Louis-Napoléon Geoffroy-Chateau’s 1836 
imagining of triumphant Bonaparte establishing a global French Empire instead of 
rotting on St Helena.51  Clearly this early example establishes one particular stimulus 
for rethinking history, on the part of the losing side in conflict.  The clustering of 
counterfactual thinking around the course and outcome of the American Civil War 
also owes something to this, while it is to be hoped that the seemingly endless 
variations on the theme of a Nazi victory in the Second World War have somewhat 
different motivations.52  More generally there is work to be done that maps the 
changing significance of what-if (and perhaps, saliently, if-only) moments in different 
cultures.   
 
What Political, Ethical and Emotional Demands do Counterfactuals Make? 
 
Although perhaps not as forthrightly expressed as E. P. Thompson’s denunciation, 
some geographers might be instinctively wary about counterfactualism, not least 
because of its recent association with a particular New Right politics, as in the work 
of Roberts and Ferguson.  Yet, is counterfactualism necessarily a nostalgic or 
revisionist historical mode concerned with what ought to have been, or is it rather, as 
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a number of papers in this collection argue, an anti-deterministic form of argument 
that insists on the radical openness of the past? Recently, Crystal Bartolovich has used 
what she describes as ‘critical counterfactualism’ as a method of questioning the 
hegemonies of neo-liberalism and American power.53   Instead of judging 
counterfactualism in any generalised or a priori sense, one of the tasks for historical 
geographers is to explore the work that specific counterfactuals perform, including the 
political, ethical and emotional demands they make.  This is important because 
counterfactual writings and analyses exist beyond the academic sphere in the world at 
large, where they are mobilised to differing success with the intention of having 
effects on audiences.  These may derive from the rhetorical or persuasive force of the 
conjectural line of reasoning, but also from the dramatic and emotional impact of 
evoking specific worlds that might have been.  Hence, to explore the path not taken is 
not just to experiment with cause and effect, but is also to consider how the world 
might have been different – for example how history might have had different 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’.   
 
In imagining a world where, say, the Atlantic slavery system involved European 
slaves and African masters, we are not concerned with its plausibility, but with ways 
of judging and measuring its consequences, and considering what is revealed about 
our world.54  Moreover, insofar as it is successful, such a dramatic counterfactual 
works not by adhering to a minimal rewriting of history, but by its use of conjecture 
to provoke, engage and move audiences.  As this suggests, there is work to be done on 
how counterfactuals work by providing disturbing reversals that can generate shock, 
anger and empathy, as well as understanding.  While most readily apparent in 
speculative fiction, counterfactual claims with similar purpose are also apparent in 
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political discourse.  It is important for historical geographers to examine the work 
done by specific counterfactuals, as well as what motivates them and how they are 
received. 
 
INTRODUCING THE PAPERS 
 
These themes are developed in various ways by the papers in this special edition.  The 
philosopher Mark Day connects debates concerning the metaphysics and 
epistemology of counterfactuals to the methodological concerns of historical 
geography.  He argues that counterfactuals are an intrinsic element of any discussions 
of cause and effect. However, Day also argues against those who seek to limit the use 
of counterfactuals to, in particular, rational action, or systems that are inherently and 
obviously chancy.  Instead he contends that the inevitability of implied 
counterfactuals should give license for an expanded role for counterfactual method in 
historical geography, in the forms of daring imaginary experiments and the innovative 
questioning of ‘what might have been’. 
 
Peter Hugill’s grand-scale rewriting of American history certainly employs plenty of 
the kind of boldness advocated by Day to show the fundamental significance of 
slavery and cotton agriculture in the developing global economy and geopolitical 
world order of the early nineteenth century.  Strikingly, Hugill employs an imagined 
rewriting of Ralph Brown’s Historical Geography of the United States, written from 
the American Empire of 1948.  The essay starts from a highly plausible 
counterfactual, indeed one that fits Ferguson’s tight rules that permit only courses of 
action that were actively considered in the past.  Hugill imagines (and Brown 
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narrates) that Thomas Jefferson had taken steps to end slavery at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  Running alongside the text, with its distinctive tone of American 
imperialist triumphalism, is a different narrative in the notes that substantiates this 
alternative history and geography with reference to key insights from established 
work on slavery, geopolitics, ecology, economics, labour systems theory and the 
study of the intersections of capitalism and technology. The counterfactual is both 
provocative and entertaining. Like many counterfactual writings there is a tendency to 
play to the potential ironies of the details of alternative worlds (so movie studios 
appear in San Antonio and Cuba).  However, the essay has two more serious points.  
Firstly, Hugill uses this device to emphasise the vital significance of the economies, 
ecologies and politics of cotton in the nineteenth century.  He argues that cotton was a 
close equivalent of oil in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and that control of 
global cotton markets and production was fundamental in the developing world order.  
Secondly, Hugill uses his counterfactual not to argue that the rise of an expansive 
American Empire was inevitable from the moment that Jefferson freed the slaves, but 
rather to develop Don Meinig’s rejection of American exceptionalism and the 
doctrine of manifest destiny. 
 
Colin Pooley’s imagining of twentieth-century Britain as a landscape without the 
private car has some features in common with Robert Fogel’s work on railways and 
American economic growth.  Like Fogel, Pooley imagines what might have happened 
without a major development in transport infrastructure; and like Fogel, Pooley’s 
conclusion is that differences were likely to have been less than might be expected.  
One justification for counterfactual experiment is in providing a way of exploring the 
significance of factors that are assumed to be essential components of certain 
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historical and geographical developments.  However, Pooley’s concerns are less about 
the economic effects of private motoring than political and ecological debates about 
the development of personal mobility. Pooley argues that this work has the potential 
to undermine those who argue for the car’s centrality to ways of life in Britain today. 
 
The next two papers focus on the politics in and of counterfactuals.  Historians Li 
Narangoa and Robert Cribb address the contingency of political geography by 
considering a series of unfulfilled territorial configurations.  They draw on A. B. 
Shamsul’s idea of ‘nations-of-intent’, which originally refers to competing political 
visions within the nation-state, and extend it to provide a tool for conceptualising 
international borders that might have been.  Li and Cribb use this to consider the 
different territorial visions that were articulated in three main post-colonial contexts: 
Inner and Outer Mongolia in early twentieth century, Indo-China after 1945 and 
Malaysia from the late 1950s.  In final part of the paper, they speculate on the political 
implications of differently-configured borders in each of these regions.  By basing 
their what-if scenarios largely on policies that were actually considered and promoted 
by key actors, including political parties and former colonial powers, Li and Cribb use 
counterfactuals to open up the spaces of political geography. 
 
David Lambert’s paper considers the role of counterfactualism in a series of ‘black 
Atlantic’ contexts, aiming to show that speculative reasoning has characterised 
attempts to represent and demand recognition for the horror, inhumanity and injustice 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and New World slavery, as well as their legacies.  He 
focuses on three contemporaneous examples: the arguments deployed by campaigners 
for slavery reparations in the USA that make use of a ‘counterfactual conception of 
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compensation’; similar arguments mobilised in an African context that draw on 
longer-standing notions of ‘underdevelopment’; and the speculative fiction of the 
African-American author, Steven Barnes, which imagines a world in which Africans 
enslave Europeans.  He argues that their conjectural concerns evince a particular way 
of engaging with slavery and aftermaths that differs from the more familiar tropes of 
ghostly return, haunting and trauma.  In this way, he opens up new lines of historical-
geographical enquiry that will enhance understanding of both how the past is made 
present, and Atlantic slavery and its legacies. 
 
Like Lambert’s examination of Barnes, in the final paper James Kneale also eschews 
a straightforward reading of the counterfactual content of alternative fiction in his 
discussion of Kim Stanley Robinson’s Years of Rice and Salt.  In what initially might 
appear to be a counter-intuitive move, Kneale approaches this alternative history of a 
world without Europe as a utopian text, drawing on work that argues that utopia 
should be thought of as an on-going critique of the present rather than a blueprint for 
the future.  In this light, alternative histories such as the Years of Rice and Salt can be 
considered utopian because they help to re-enchant the relationship between the past 
and the present by reminding us that space is multiple and open.  This sense of 
openness has been most forcefully articulated by Massey and in Kneale’s paper as 
elsewhere, her work serves as a touchstone and inspiration for asking questions about 
what might have been. 
 
These papers are, we would argue, a starting point for a more extensive flourishing of 
thinking about counterfactuals in geography.  We are not unequivocal advocates of all 
forms of counterfactual work, and there are certainly plenty of examples of 
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counterfactual writing that fail either as tightly defined exercises in cause-and-effect, 
or as broader thought-experiments along the lines of Diamond’s, or else as creatively 
imagined alternative worlds.  Nonetheless we do advocate further work in historical 
geography, particularly as indicated by our four broad questions above.  We have two 
rather disparate motivations for this.  First we believe that the re-enagagement with 
issues of causality implied by counterfactual experiment could be an important 
contribution towards what has become known in Geography as ‘conversations across 
the divide’.55  We are not suggesting a return to the positivistic modelling of past 
events argued for by Norton.  Instead what we are arguing for are extended notions of 
cause and possibility, that bring distinctive qualities from the humanities as well as 
from disciplines such as social psychology and political science.  Our second 
motivation for recommending counterfactual approaches is because of their potential 
for the geographical imagination.  Good counterfactual writing is about the pleasures 
and enchantments of imagining how things might have been, or might be different.  It 
is about open thinking, that can work positively through the notion of possibility, and 
it is also a form that has tremendous potential for connection and engagement with 
wider popular imaginations. 
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